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REDESIGNING THE SPOUSE'S FORCED SHARE*
John H. Langbeint
Lawrence W. Waggoner*
EDITOR'S SYNOPSIS: This article discusses the history of the forced share, the justifications
for it, and the uneven fit between the rule and the objectives, then proposes a new
approach that would meet the objectives.
American forced-share law underwent a major round of reform in the
1960s. The main objective was to prevent the decedent from engaging in "fraud
on the widow's share," that is, using nominal inter vivos transfers to evade
the surviving spouse's forced-share entitlement. In jurisdictions that follow the
Uniform Probate Code of 1969 (UPC), that mischief has been eradicated. The
UPC, which is discussed in some detail below,2 extends the forced-share en-
titlement to property that has been the subject of inter vivos transfer.
In the present article we develop the view that the time has come for a
further round of reform of the forced-share system. With concern about evasion
largely resolved, we direct attention to the underlying architecture of the forced
share. Taking the UPC provisions as our model, we point to serious discrep-
ancies between purpose and practice in the forced-share system, and we pro-
pose legislative correctives. We show that our proposal would remedy the
worst shortcoming of modern American forced-share law-its astonishing in-
sensitivity to differences in the duration of a marriage. If a marriage ends in
death, the statutes currently in force allow the surviving spouse the same
entitlement in the decedent's estate whether the marriage lasted five days or
five decades. We recommend a means for adjusting the forced share to the
duration of the marriage.
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the authors.
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2
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (UPC), 8 U.L.A. (1983 ed.). The UPC elective-share provisions are
discussed infra, text at notes 38-43, and reproduced in Appendix B, infra at p. 326. See generally
Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable
Elective Share, 62 16owA L. REv. 981 (1977).
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I. MARITAL PROPERTY REGIMES AND THE FORCED SHARE
Forced-share law abridges the testamentary freedom of a married person
to disinherit his surviving spouse. The spouse's forced share overrides any
contrary disposition in the decedent's will. The typical American forced-share
statute provides that the surviving spouse may claim a one-third share of the
decedent's estate. This forced share is expressed as an option that the survivor
may elect or decline during the administration of the decedent's estate, hence
the synonym "elective share."
3
A spouse also has the power to waive the forced-share right by contract,
either during the marriage or by means of a premarital agreement.4 Apart from
the carriage trade, such agreements have not been common in the United
States, although as the population ages there is good reason for thinking that
such agreements will be more frequently employed, especially in remarriage
situations.
The national anthem celebrates America as the land of the free, and in
the law of wills that boast deserves to be taken very seriously. America is
uniquely the land of testamentary freedom. In none other of the world's great
legal systems would you be so free to choose whom you want to receive your
property when you die. If you were to die domiciled in any of the European
states, your children (and in some circumstances other blood relatives as well)
would have a forced share. 5 In England and in the principal Commonwealth
jurisdictions (the Australian states, the Canadian provinces, New Zealand),
your testamentary freedom would be differently restricted, under a statutory
scheme known as Testator's Family Maintenance (TFM).6 Your descendants and
other relatives are not entitled to statutorily calculated forced shares as on the
Continent; rather, the chancery judge exercises a vast discretion to revise the
disposition in your will for the benefit of your relatives and other dependents.
When, however, we turn away from the question of the power to disinherit
children, and we examine instead the power to disinherit a spouse, the picture
alters dramatically. The English and Commonwealth solution remains the same;
TFM empowers the judge to modify your will as he thinks appropriate for the
benefit of your spouse.7 But as between American and European law, the
3E.g., UPC § 2-201. For an up-to-date compilation of the various state statutes, see Joslyn,
Surviving Spouse's Right To Share in Deceased Spouse's Estate: ACPC Study No. 10, in ACPC
STUDIES (American College of Probate Counsel, 1985).
4
UPC § 2-204.
'See, e.g., for Germany, T. Kipp & H. Coing, ERBRECHT 52-105 (13th ed. 1978).
6See generally R. Davern Wright, TESTATOR's FAMILY MAINTENANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
(3d ed. 1974). These statutes now empower the courts to alter intestate as well as testate shares,
hence the tendency to change the title of the legislation so that it no longer speaks of testation
alone. The current English version is the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act
1975, c. 63, on which, see generally J. Ross Martyn, FAMILY PROVISION: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1985); R. Oughton & E. Tyler, TYLER'S FAMILY PROVISION (2d ed. 1984); and J. Miller, FAMILY PROPERTY
AND FINANCIAL PROVISION (2d ed. 1983).
71nfra, text at notes 32-34.
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contrast is exactly reversed. American law exemplifies a forced-share system
for spouses, European law has none.
The reason that American law abandons its predilection for testamentary
freedom in the case of spouses has to do with marital-property law-the rules
that characterize the property relations between spouses. Exclude for the mo-
ment the strongly divergent tradition in the eight American community-property
states8 and consider the remaining, so-called common law states. The basic
principle in the common law states is that marital status does not affect the
ownership of property. The regime is one of separate property. Each spouse
owns all that he earns, even when the logic of the marriage is that one spouse
earns less, or nothing at all, in order to enable the other to earn more. Although
John and Mary have arranged that Mary will free John for the workplace by
caring for their home and children, the property John earns is his alone (unless,
of course, he does something further by way of contract or gratuity to divide
his property with her)Y By contrast, in the eight community-property states,
and in the Spanish legal system from whence our community-property states
derived their model, Mary would have an immediate half interest in the property
that John earns during the marriage. This half interest in the fruits of the marriage
is called the community of acquests (in contrast to the so-called universal
community, in which spousal rights attach even to property earned before the
marriage or acquired through inheritance or gift).10
Legal-academic opinion in the United States today generally prefers the
community of acquests over common law separate property. Mary's service in
the home enables John to be the wage earner while Mary specializes in what
8They are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Wash-
ington. In addition, Wisconsin is now to be reckoned a community property state by virtue of
adopting a version of the Uniform Marital Property Act; see infra text at note 12.
'Glendon has pointed out that forces of convergence have narrowed the seeming gap between
separate- and community-property regimes. The tendency of spouses to hold bank accounts and
realty in joint tenancy "has become so widespread in the United States that it amounts to a form
of quasi-community property . . . ." M. Glendon, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 154 (1977). Glendon also remarks on the tendency of
American courts to infer interspousal transfers. Id. at 155-56. She cites, for example, In re Estate
of Smith, 90 III. App. 2d 305, 232 N.E.2d 310 (1967), in which the court held that the spouses'
joint use of furniture and household artifacts led to the conclusion that they had intended to hold
the property as tenants in common, without regard to which spouse was the source of the property.
(Regarding similar presumptions within community-property systems for dealing with asserted
separate property, see infra text at note 22.)
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, which amends the federal pension law (Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974, [ERISAI), is a further example of creeping community
property. It creates spousal rights in the employed spouse's pension. See generally Terry & Smith,
Guide to the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 24 TAX NOTES 1195 (1984).
'0See the typology developed in Rheinstein & Glendon, INTERSPOUSAL RELATIONS, §§ 4-53 to
4-55, at 48-49, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PERSONS AND FAMILY (Hamburg
1975). For American authority, see generally W. McClanahan, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (1982 and Cum. Supp.).
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the economists call household production. Their enterprise is in truth collab-
orative, and Mary should have an immediate interest in the property that results
from the collaboration. If John and Mary are both in the workforce, as is
increasingly the case, Mary is likely to take less remunerative employment, of
the sort that is easier to leave and then resume after a longish interval of
childcare. Even if both spouses remain continually in the workforce, their family
life is likely to entangle their financial affairs so significantly that it is trouble-
some and artificial to isolate separate streams of income and expenditure.
In 1983 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
endorsed a species of the community of acquests when it promulgated the
Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA). 1" Although Wisconsin adopted a version
of UMPA and is now reckoned as the ninth community-property state,12 the
prospects for widespread adoption of UMPA in the separate-property states to
which it is addressed appear bleak. The act has encountered resistance from
the organized bar, in large measure for fear that the scheme of lifetime dual
management that the act propounds is too complex.13
It is essential to understand that American forced-share law is entirely a con-
sequence of the separate-property regime for marital property. Our community-
property states do not have forced-share statutes.14 Forced-share law is the law
of the second best. It undertakes upon death to correct the failure of a separate-
property state to create the appropriate lifetime rights for spouses in each other's
earnings.
II. THE RATIONALE OF THE FORCED SHARE
Early forced-share statutes protected only wives (hence the former term,
the "widow's share"). In the present age of ever greater attention to equality
between the sexes, the forced-share statutes have been unisexed. Husband and
wife have precisely reciprocal rights in the estates of each other. From the
standpoint of antidiscrimination law, this development is undoubtedly correct
and quite inevitable. As a descriptive matter, however, unisexing tends to
"Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA), 9A U.L.A. 21 (1987 Supp).
'2Rev. Rul. 87-13, 1987-1 C. B. __ . See generally on the Wisconsin legislation the
symposium issue, Marital Property Reform, 57 Wis. BAR BULL. (July 1984).
3See Interview, The Wisconsin Experience with Marital Property Reform, 125 TR. & EsT. 31
(April 1986) (interview of Michael Wilcox of Wisconsin Bar).
4Save that in California and Idaho, the problem of migratory spouses has been addressed
through the recognition of so-called quasi-community property (property acquired elsewhere that
would have been characterized as community property had the spouses been under the community
regime when the property was acquired). Idaho, a UPC state, applies the UPC's augmented-estate
forced-share system to quasi-community property. IDAHO C. §§ 15-2-101 et seq. This amounts
to a special-purpose forced-share statute for migratory property. California's new statute, PROBATE
CODE § 101, enacted in 1983, creates a nonelective half share for the surviving spouse in the
quasi-community property.
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conceal what forced-share law is really about, which is the economic depen-
dency that marriage often entails for one of the spouses, traditionally the wife.
Forced-share law is not Yuppie Law. If both John and Mary were routinely
going to be vice presidents at the Morgan Guaranty Bank, nobody would much
care about giving them reciprocal claims in each other's estates. Mary could
take care of herself. Indeed, under existing law serious Yuppies will contract
out of the forced-share system by means of a premarital agreement. For the
future there will doubtless be more wives of independent means, and some
more house-husbands, but--especially across the breadth of the population
and away from elite groups-traditional patterns of intrafamilial specialization
are continuing.' 5 The preeminent legal and social policy that underlies the
forced-share statutes is to limit the freedom of testation of the primary bread-
winner, in recognition of the economic dependency that a conventional mar-
riage characteristically entails for the spouse who specializes in what the econ-
omists call household production.
Interestingly, this protective policy has found expression in a pair of com-
peting theories that purport to supply the rationale for the forced-share system.
One is the support or need theory; the other is the contribution or marital-
property theory.
A. Support
As for the support theory, the label pretty much suggests the argument.
The breadwinner has a duty of support during his lifetime, which he ought not
to be able to evade in death. If, however, you probe the typical forced-share
statute, you will find that it is quite deficient in implementing a support policy.
On the one hand, the fixed fraction, usually a third of the decedent's estate,
may be woefully inadequate to the surviving spouse's needs, especially in a
modest estate.' 6 On the other hand, all but a few' 7 forced-share statutes award
'S"Relatively few women work continuously over the total period during which they are
employed .... Young women's intermittent participation in the labor force is closely tied to
childbearing." Voydanoff, Women's Work, Family, and Health, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT,
FUTURE 69, 73-74 (BNA: Industrial Relations Research Ass'n Ser.) (1987).
161nfra, text at notes 35-36, we recommend that the forced-share traction be increased trom
a third to a half. Note that in the intestacy scheme of UPC section 2-102(2)-(3) the surviving
spouse takes the first $50,000 plus half of the remaining probate estate. In the mid-1960s when
the UPC was drafted, $50,000 was the equivalent of about $150,000 current dollars. Thus, the
object was to award the surviving spouse 100 percent of a small estate. But the purpose of that
reform was intent-serving-to tailor an intestacy regime that would most closely resemble the
wishes of the typical intestate decedent. See UPC Article 2, Part I, Comment. Because forced-
share law is intent-defeating, the rationale for the UPC's generous intestate provision is absent.
'"For discussion of Alabama, Mississippi, and New Jersey statutes that take account of the
survivor's need, see Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights at Death, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 95, 140-
41 (1983).
The UPC also resorts to an alternative need-based forced-share standard in the special situation
governed by section 2-203, treating the surviving spouse of impaired capacity who has been
placed under protective regime. The right of election in that case "may be exercised only by order
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the fixed fraction regardless of whether the survivor is in actual need-that is,
even when the survivor has independent means that are quite ample. Both
these objections to the support theory are of a similar sort-that the forced-
share statute addresses need badly because it adopts a categoric rather than
an individuated standard. There is, of course, an answer to that objection-
the usual answer whenever the law uses arbitrary categories. Individuation is
costly, and the cost may not be worth the gain.
B. Contribution
The other theory, the contribution theory, relates forced-share law back
to what we have identified as its origin, in the shortcomings of the separate-
property marital-property regime. Spouses are highly likely to have contributed
to each other's nominal earnings through various forms of intrafamilial support.
Especially in the conventional marriage, in which the burdens of home and
childcare fall mainly upon the wife, she should be entitled to a share of what
she helped her husband earn. Accordingly, the contribution theory is sometimes
expressed as a "partnership" or "sharing" theory.
The contribution theory has surprisingly ancient roots. Lewis Simes traced
the earliest American forced-share legislation to the colonial and early national
period.-5 He noticed that the North Carolina legislature gave strong expression
to the contribution rationale as early as 1784, in a statute that created a forced
share for the widow in her husband's personal property. The preamble explains
that, because dower in unimproved frontier real estate "is a very inadequate
Provision for the support of such Widows, . . . it is highly just and reasonable
that those who by their Prudence, Economy and Industry, have contributed to
raise up an estate to their Husbands, should be entitled to share in it.' 19
The contribution theory is intrinsically more plausible than the support
theory, because the contribution theory responds directly to the defective marital-
property regime of the separate-property states. Remember that in community-
property states there are still plenty of needy widows, but no forced-share
statutes. Once contribution has been rewarded, nothing more is done to adjust
the division of marital property to take account of the survivor's need. Thus,
of the court in which protective proceedings as to [the survivor's] property are pending, after
finding that exercise is necessary to provide adequate support for the [survivor] during his probable
life expectancy." Id. (emphasis supplied). The UPC rule is generally, but not universally, followed
in American law; see Annot., Factors Considered in Making Election for Incompetent to Take
Under or Against Will, 3 A.L.R.3d 6 (1965 and Supp.). For a prominent instance of adherence to
the contrary rule, see In re Estate of Clarkson, 193 Neb. 201, 226 N.W.2d 334 (1975). The UPC
rule does not, we think, proceed from a general support theory of the forced share. Rather, it
reflects the judgment that, because only a handful of surviving spouses exercise the forced share
entitlement when competent, there should not be a rule of automatic election by the fiduciary for
an incompetent spouse.
11L. Simes, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 13-16 (1955).
"9N.C. Laws (Iredell, 1791), 490, Acts of 1784, c. 10, cited by L. Simes, supra note 18, at
13-14 and n.27.
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we see in the forced-share system for separate-property states a contingent
marital-property regime, under which the law presumes irrebuttably that the
survivor contributed materially to the decedent's wealth.
There is, of course, a considerable overlap between the contribution theory
and the competing support theory-the North Carolina statute of 1 784 speaks
both of support and of contribution. Property assuages need. Rewarding the
survivor's contribution assures a crude measure of support. We shall return to
the subject of this overlap in connection with one of our recommendations for
redesigning the forced-share system.
When tested against the reality of modern forced-share law, the contri-
bution theory is not free from difficulty. Because the idea is essentially resti-
tutionary-Mary is recovering from John's estate a part of his property that was
really hers-it is odd that we seem not to acknowledge or protect her interest
during his lifetime. She cannot, for example, get injunctive relief against his
dissipating the property.20 However, it may be reasonable to see the potent
remedies available on divorce as framing a species of shadow lifetime regime.
21
That is to say, Mary's ability to obtain a property settlement in the event of
divorce gives her bargaining power with John about his use of the property
during the persistence of the marriage.
Another discrepancy between the contribution theory and current practice
is that the forced share extends to all of the decedent's property, including
property acquired before the marriage or property that came to the decedent
through gift or inheritance-in other words, property that the surviving spouse
did not help earn. Again, the justification seems to be that individuation is not
worth the cost-the cost in this instance being the clumsiness and unfairness
of trying to reconstruct a species of post-mortem community of acquests when
the decedent is no longer alive to participate in the proofs. Better a crude
fraction of everything the decedent owned and be done with it. Even in
community-property systems, a similar notion is at work in a fundamental
although rebuttable presumption, that property found in the possession of a
spouse during the marriage is community property unless the spouse who
alleges that the item is separate property can prove it.22
Even harder to square with the contribution theory is that aspect of forced-
share law that we have advertised as its worst shortcoming, failure to take into
2
0The New York Court of Appeals spelled this point out in Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,
9 N.E.2d 966 (1937), the leading case discussed infra, text at notes 25-28. The forced share "is
only an expectant interest dependent upon the contingency that the property ... becomes a part
of a decedent's estate. The contingency does not occur, and the expectant property right does not
ripen into a property right in possession, if the owner sells or gives away the property." 275 N.Y.
at 376, 9 N.E.2d at 967 (citations omitted).
2
1We invoke the image from Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
22
E.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. Art. 2340; TExAS FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.02.
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account the duration of the marriage. Manifestly, the spouse of five days23 has
not contributed remotely as much as has the spouse of five decades. Here the
disparity between theory and implementation is so enormous that the customary
apologetics about administrative convenience are not convincing. Either the
contribution theory misdescribes the purpose of a forced-share system that
tolerates such a disparity or, as we shall presently argue, that shortcoming of
our forced-share system needs to be repaired in order to implement the theory
properly.
III. SERIAL POLYGAMY
Despite its worthy aspiration to redress the inadequacy of our marital-
property law, modern forced-share law does more harm than good. The prob-
lem is-if we may lapse into the jargon of modern constitutional law-that the
forced share is wildly overinclusive. For every rescued survivor who fits the
stereotype of a victim being cheated of his or her contribution to the decedent's
wealth, the forced-share law sweeps in many spouses-mostly remarried
spouses, typically the decedent's second spouse from a late-in-life marriage of
short duration-for whom the forced share is a windfall.
The time has come to speak of serial polygamy. In modern times it has
become increasingly common for people to have more than one spouse-alas,
not simultaneously as in the good old days, but in a series. Divorce and
remarriage is the most common variety of serial polygamy, a variety that now
abounds in modern marriage behavior. From the standpoint of the troubled
forced-share law, we are concerned with a remarriage pattern that is not pri-
marily associated with divorce: the tendency among the elderly, whether di-
vorced or widowed, to remarry later in life. The phenomenon is more notice-
able among elderly men; since fewer men survive into advanced years, their
chances of remarrying are correspondingly higher. Good data on remarriage
late in life is hard to find, but the evidence of the troubled forced-share case
law reinforces our impression that the phenomenon has become more common
across the twentieth century. Growing longevity and better health in advanced
years predispose the elderly to live more fully, and taboos against this sort of
marriage have probably abated.
These late-in-life marriages produce repugnant results under forced-share
law. The short duration of the marriage undercuts the return-of-contribution
rationale. The late-in-life spouse makes at best a modest contribution to the
decedent's earnings. Worse, the decedent is likely to have had children by a
former marriage. A well-known study published in 1960 examined all the
23The notion that serious property consequences attach to marriages of the shortest duration
is no figment of the academic imagination. See, e.g., Neiderhiser Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 302
(1977), for a case in which the widow received the full intestate share (larger than the forced
share) after her husband collapsed and died during the wedding ceremony. (We owe this reference
to Jesse Dukeminier.)
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forced-share litigation that could be found in the law reports up to that time.
The author, W.D. Macdonald, found that, of those cases in which he could
identify the relationships, more than half pitted children of a former marriage
against a later spouse.
24
The objection to awarding the forced share in these circumstances is
manifest. The forced share devolves upon a spouse whose contribution to the
decedent's wealth bears no relation to what theory presupposes. It is wrong
for a legal system that otherwise places such paramount value on freedom of
testation to abridge that freedom when the benefit flows to a person who stands
so far outside the protective purpose.
Consider, for example, the marriage that was involved in the most famous
of all forced-share cases, Newman v. Dore, 25 decided in 1937. The lawsuit
concerned the question of whether the husband could defeat his wife's forced
share by transferring all his property to a revocable inter vivos trust that excluded
her. The New York Court of Appeals prevented what it called this illusory
transfer. In the fifty years since that decision, a great legislative reform move-
ment has largely solved the problem that preoccupied the court in Newman
v. Dore. Statutes promulgated in the 1960s in New York and in Uniform Probate
Code jurisdictions26 now effectively block off the nonprobate system as an
avenue for evading the forced-share entitlement. The newer statutes extend
the spouse's forced-share right to reach property of the decedent that is passing
in nonprobate channels, such as the revocable inter vivos trust in Newman v.
Dore.
But Newman v. Dore exemplifies a second great theme of American forced-
share law, a theme that the reform legislation of recent decades has left un-
touched-namely, the failure to adjust the forced share to take account of the
radically different equities that are present in situations of serial polygamy. The
court in Newman v. Dore said nary a word about the marriage upon which
the widow based her forced-share claim. The actual facts are these: The de-
cedent, Mr. Straus, died in his eightieth year. His first wife had predeceased
him, and when he was 76 years old he married a woman in her thirties. This
second wife was the widow whose forced share the court protected. At Straus'
death a divorce action was pending in which the second wife had complained
that Straus'
27
perverted sexual habits made it impossible for her to live with him. The record
never makes clear the nature of his alleged perversions although it does include
a newspaper account in which he is described as having received a transplant of
monkey glands by surgical operation. In the manner of a perfectly normal, red-
24W. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 156-57 (1960).
25275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
26N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981 and Supp.); UPC §§ 2-201,
2-202, and 2-207.
2
7E. Clark, L. Lusky & A. Murphy, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 147 (3d ed.
1985).
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blooded octogenarian, he was highly indignant over these charges. He brought
an action for annulment of the marriage, which was also pending at his death,
and [he] instructed his lawyer to see to it that that "whore" and, here, at least,
displaying some confusion as to genders, "son of a bitch" was not to receive any
of his estate at death.
The authors who gathered this information about Newman v. Dore for a note
in their casebook are posing a question that is more sarcastic than socratic.
They ask readers to reflect whether "[t]hese seamy details of a tragic second
marriage between a young woman and a pathetic old man two and a half times
her age" comport well with "the usual policy statements on the subject" of
the forced share.28
Why does modern forced-share law continue to inflict these windfalls?
Surely not for legislative neglect of the field-remember the great initiatives of
the 1960s that redesigned the forced-share statutes to foreclose inter vivos
evasion. Nor are we aware of any body of opinion that finds merit in awarding
these windfalls. The failure to remedy the injustice of serial-polygamy forced
shares arises from essentially technical grounds. Legal policymakers understand
that the present law is working injustice, but they seem to have been unable
to find statutory concepts to correct it. Specifying the reform is difficult. Mar-
riages do not easily sort themselves into types, some within and the others
outside the purposes of forced-share law. It would be wrong, for example,
simply to exclude the spouses of remarriages from forced-share protection;
after all, for many people a remarriage is the enduring marriage, achieved after
one or both spouses recover from a false start and early divorce.
IV. PREVIOUS REFORM PROPOSALS
In the legal-academic literature, there have been two prominent proposals
for reforming the forced share. These proposals, which we pause to examine,
tend in opposite directions. What they have in common is overkill. They are
enormously broad, hence they underscore the difficulty of refining the cate-
gories of existing forced-share law.
A. Abolition
Twenty years ago Sheldon Plager proposed a reform of breathtaking sim-
plicity. He suggested that the forced-share system be abolished. Coining a
memorable phrase, Plager called the forced share "a solution in search of a
problem. ' 29 He pointed to a simple truth: Spouses ordinarily need no protection
against disinheritance. If you live out a long-duration marriage, you are or-
dinarily quite devoted to your spouse. Careful empirical investigation has been
281d. at 148.
29Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L.
REv. 681 (1966). In a similar vein, see Clark, The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes To Preserve
the Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REv. 513 (1970);
see also Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 469 (1976).
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done on this question, and it shows that, far from trying to disinherit the survivor,
the typical spouse strains in the opposite direction: He leaves everything to
the surviving spouse, even at the price of disinheriting their children.30 Plager
argued that forced-share law therefore did more harm than good; for every
deserving spouse whom forced-share law protected from an unjustified dis-
inheritance, countless unjustified forced-share windfalls were created, pri-
marily in remarriage cases.
The liberalization of divorce law that has mostly occurred since Plager
wrote supplies a further ground in support of his argument. Death and divorce
are cognate phenomena, they are the two ways to dissolve a marriage. It is
odd to think of death and divorce as alternatives, since the spouses in those
two modes of dissolution ordinarily have wholly different aspirations for each
other. But there is an important connection between the liberalization of divorce
and our question of forced-share policy. The relative ease with which an un-
happy spouse may now escape a sour marriage means that such a person need
no longer feel locked into a bad marriage until death. Accordingly, there is
less reason to fear that marital discord will result in the unjustified disinheritance
of a spouse. The deserving spouse whose contribution forced-share law is trying
to protect now has a realistic lifetime remedy in the property settlement incident
to divorce.
Thus, both the increase in divorce and the increase in remarriage that
typify late-twentieth-century serial polygamy supply cause for thinking about
abolishing the forced-share system. But abolition would work fresh injustice.
It would expose the long-duration spouse to the risk of disinheritance. Although
cases in which the long-duration spouse is disinherited are exceptionally rare,
part of the explanation is that the forced-share system has protected that spouse
well. The forced-share entitlement works mainly by deterrent; it encourages
the reluctant testator to make provision for his spouse in order to spare his
estate the nuisance and notoriety of forced-share proceedings. Furthermore,
divorce is not a wholly satisfactory alternative to the forced share. For people
of certain religious persuasions, divorce is not an option; and even within the
rest of the populace, divorce offers no remedy in the case of surprise
disinheritance.
Thus, it is safe to say that the consensus in favor of having a forced-share
system will endure. Indeed, the most recurrent proposal for reforming the forced
share would cut in quite the opposite direction-it would expand the reach of
forced-share law. The idea would be to refashion our law in imitation of the
system that prevails in England and the Commonwealth, Testator's Family Main-
tenance (TFM).31
10M. Sussman, J. Cates & D. Smith, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 86, 89-90 (1970); Browder,
Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1303,
1307-08 (1969); Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death,
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 252 (1962); Plager, supra note 29, at 708-12; Price, The Transmission of
Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L. REv. 277, 283, 311-17 (1975).
I'Supra, text at notes 6-7.
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B. TFM
TFM empowers a judge to vary the testator's will in order "to make rea-
sonable financial provision" for the surviving spouse.3 2 The late-in-life second
or third spouse would not fare very well under TFM, because the court can
weigh the competing equities of the children of the first marriage; and because
the statute directs the court to pay attention to the adequacy of the later spouse's
own resources; the spouse's age; and "the duration of the marriage.
'" 33
TFM would, therefore, supply a remedy.of sorts for the shortcoming of
American forced-share law that we have been discussing, but at a terrible price.
TFM remits to judicial discretion every important issue of policy in forced-
share law. TFM exposes the estate of every married testator to potential liti-
gation, on an issue of the greatest difficulty. The statutes do not define the
"reasonable provision" standard because that standard cannot be defined; it
means, subject to hazy guidelines, whatever the judge who happens to hear
the case happens to think is fair. The late Justice Frank Hutley of the New South
Wales Supreme Court once remarked to one of us--only partly in jest-that
in New South Wales, as a result of TFM, "the only thing that a testator can be
sure of achieving by will is his choice of an executor." Disturbing as that
prospect is in English and Commonwealth jurisdictions, whose judicial selec-
tion procedures have produced a trustworthy and meritocratic bench, it is even
more frightening to imagine granting such power to judges in such American
venues as Cook County, Illinois, where the very mention of the local bench is
cause for alarm. Broad judicial discretion cannot be devolved upon the Grey-
lord judiciary. So long as American judicial selection practices prefer politics
over merit, TFM can have no future in the United States, although revivals of
interest among academic writers34 will occur periodically.
We conclude this discussion of past approaches to the forced share on a
note of stalemate. The shortcoming in our law has been identified, but because
the cures seem worse than the disease, the shortcoming abides.
V. AN ACCRUAL-TYPE FORCED SHARE
We wish to turn a fresh leaf and advance some proposals for legislative
reform that have not thus far been considered. As our starting point, we return
to the basic principles of forced-share law that we identified at the outset of
this article. We explained why the forced-share system is best understood as
a species of ersatz marital-property law, whose purpose is to effect a return of
the spouse's presumed contribution to the decedent's wealth. We pointed out
2Inheritance (Provisions for Family and Dependents) Act § 1 (1975).
331d. §§ 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a), discussed in J. Miller, supra note 6, at 443, 446.
34E.g., Note, Family Maintenance: An Inheritance Scheme for the Living, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 673
(1977); contrast the lucid critique of TFM in Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986). For citations to earlier literature,
see E. Clark, et al., supra note 27, at 197.
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that in a community property state, because each spouse enjoys a reciprocal
half interest in the earnings of the other spouse, there is no forced-share statute.
Serial polygamy is at least as typical of a place like California as it is of
the rest of the country, yet in California and Texas and in the other community-
property states serial polygamy does not give rise to the windfalls that disgrace
forced-share law in the common law states. Why? What is it about community-
property law that enables it to function so smoothly in the world of serial
polygamy?
The great attribute of community-property law that fits it for modern pat-
terns of marriage behavior is that community-property rights are automatically
adjusted for the duration of the marriage. The community-property right in a
spouse's earnings attaches only to the property earned during the persistence
of the marriage. Let us supply a couple of simple hypothetical cases; in each
we assume that the parties have not altered the community-property regime
by contract.
In the prototypical case, John and Mary live a forty-year marriage, during
which John is the wage earner and Mary the homemaker. The property is all
in John's name. Mary has a half interest in all that John earned during the forty
years. If John dies first and should wish to disinherit Mary-in favor, let us say,
of Fifi-John's will can pass his own half interest in the property to Fifi, but
not Mary's half interest.
Now contrast a serial-polygamy case. Suppose that the forty-year marriage
of John and Mary terminates upon Mary's death. Afterwards, John gets re-
married, to his erstwhile companion, Flora. Two years thereafter, John dies.
The community property regime provides for Flora a half interest in whatever
John earned during their two-year marriage, but all John's earnings from the
years prior to that marriage, together with anything that John may have inherited
from Mary (such as the property to which Mary was entitled as a result of her
half interest in John's earnings during their forty-year marriage), will be John's
separate property and not subject to Flora's community-property claim. Note
well that if these facts had transpired in a separate-property state with a con-
ventional forced-share scheme, Flora would have taken the full one-third forced
share in John's estate.
These illustrations are meant to show why serial polygamy is a nonissue
in community-property systems. The community-property regime adjusts the
spouse's interest to the duration of the marriage. Notice further that this ad-
justment occurs automatically. Unlike, for example, the TFM scheme, under
which the judge would exercise discretion to apportion John's estate between
such claimants as Flora and John's heirs, in a community-property regime the
apportionment is wholly mechanical. These are the two distinctive attributes
of the community-property approach to serial polygamy: the spouse's share is
mechanically determined, and it is crudely measured by the duration of the
marriage.
In the redesign of the forced-share system that we propose in this article,
we shall be imitating key features of community-property (and UMPA) law; but
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we avoid both of the characteristic drawbacks of community law-the cum-
bersome lifetime dual management regime and the tracing-to-source of non-
community property. We call for a forced-share entitlement that is sensitive to
the duration of the marriage; that is mechanically determined; and that resem-
bles the fifty/fifty split of community and UMPA law. We envision an accrual-
type forced-share system in which the forced share grows with the length of
the marriage. The particular analogy that we have in mind is the vesting sched-
ule in a pension plan. Under a vesting schedule, there are two elements to
consider: the amount of the ultimate benefit, and the rate at which one's
entitlement in that benefit becomes indefeasible.
A. Amount: Increase the Forced-Share Fraction to Half
In forced-share law the analogue to the retirement benefit under a pension
plan would be the statutory fraction of the decedent's estate, which in the UPC
and most non-UPC jurisdictions is one-third of the estate. We would increase
this fraction from a third to a half,3s primarily to align the forced-share fraction
with the half interest that characterizes the functionally similar community-
property and UMPA systems.36 (We explain shortly that we would apply the
fraction to an entity that is somewhat differently calculated than the probate
estate or the "augmented estate" to which the present statutes apply.) We
suspect that the one-third figure in present law is a hangover from the one-
third life estate in common law dower. We think that the return-of-contribution
theory better supports a fifty/fifty split.
B. Accrual: Schedule the Forced Share to Vest over Time
We recommend that the survivor's forced-share entitlement be phased in,
according to a predetermined formula. We call this an accrual-type forced
share.
Under current law, when John and Mary leave the altar on the day of their
marriage, each has a one-third forced share in the estate of the other. Under
our proposal, the forced-share right of each spouse would vest incrementally
across time. Suppose, for example, that the revised scheme allowed 10 percent
of the forced share to vest upon marriage, and the remaining 90 percent of
the forced share to vest in 5-percent annual increments. On those numbers,
it would take eighteen years for each spouse to acquire the full 100 percent
interest in the forced-share fraction, whatever its amount. (We have no strong
3 This step has already been taken in Nebraska. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2313, noted in Volkmer,
supra note 17, at 149 (1983).
36The increase from a third to a half would also bring the forced-share fraction into greater
parity with the half interest that is now commonly the share of the surviving spouse under both
the intestacy and the pretermitted spouse statutes. Under UPC § 2-102(2)-(4), the surviving spouse
takes a half share in intestacy when the decedent also leaves children; when no issue or parent
survives the decedent, the spouse takes the entire estate under UPC § 2-102(1). UPC § 2-301
awards a spouse who is omitted from the decedent's premarital will the intestate share just described.
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feeling about the precise period of time that is appropriate for such a forced-
share vesting schedule. The idea is to increase the entitlement as the length of
the marriage increases; and to do it by a mechanical formula that, while
necessarily arbitrary, is simple to calculate and admits no judicial discretion.)
Vl. THE SURVIVOR'S PROPERTY
Our concluding group of proposals would refine the mode of calculating
the forced share, by taking into account the survivor's own property. This
proposal, for which there is support in a few of the existing state statutes
3 7
shares with our other recommendations the object of approximating the out-
comes that would be achieved under a community of acquests (or under
UMPA), but in a mechanical fashion.
Under the community of acquests, each spouse has an immediate half
interest in the property that the other spouse earns during the marriage, which
means that each spouse incurs an immediate reduction of half of the property
arising from his or her earnings. Thus, when death terminates the marriage,
the surviving spouse's property has already been reduced by the value of the
decedent spouse's half interest.
By contrast, most American forced-share statutes disregard the property
that the survivor has earned and titled in his or her name. Consider, for example,
the UPC's augmented-estate scheme, whose statutory text is reproduced in full
as Appendix B of this article. The augmented estate is a tripartite computational
entity that includes:
(1) The decedent's net38 probate estate.
(2) The value of property that the decedent transferred during the marriage
by means of various will substitutes to persons other than the spouse.3 9
(This is the UPC's recapture mechanism for defeating the "fraud on
the widow's share" that had so troubled the case law of the middle
third of this century.40) For convenience we shall call this class of
property the "recapturables."
(3) The value of any of the survivor's property that the decedent had
transferred gratuitously to the spouse.41 We call this the "spousal
setoff" property.
The UPC's forced-share fraction (presently one-third42) is applied to this
computational entity. Property included in the augmented estate that belongs
3
'Supra, note 1 7.
18By "net" we refer to the definition in the opening sentence of UPC § 2-202 that reduces
the (probate) estate by the amount of funeral and administrative expenses, homestead allowances,
family allowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims (excluding estate and inheritance
taxes).
39UPC § 2-202(1).
ISee Macdonald, supra note 1; and discussion, supra, text at notes 24-26.
41UPC § 2-202(2).
42UPC § 2-201.
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to the survivor (spousal setoff property) or that passes to the survivor as a result
of the decedent's death is applied first to satisfy the forced share. 43 As a result,
the decedent cannot defeat the forced share by means of the common will
substitutes; on the other hand, a surviving spouse for whom the decedent makes
ample lifetime provision is precluded from forcing a further share.
We propose to make a pair of further adjustments in the UPC's augmented-
estate system, in order to achieve the larger purpose of approximating the
community property/UMPA outcome. 44 In this instance, the feature that we
believe should be emulated is that under community law there is a fifty/fifty
split in the property acquired by both spouses during the marriage.
A. The Property: Combine the Spouses' Augmented Estates
But Charge the Survivor with His Own.
Our proposal would make two alterations in the UPC's augmented estate.
First, we would substitute for the present entity, which is constructed only on
the decedent's augmented estate, a combined augmented estate that merges
both the decedent's and the surviving spouse's augmented estates. This entity
would, in fact, eliminate an administrative complexity inherent in the current
UPC augmented-estate entity, which requires that the spousal setoff property
be traced. Our proposal entails no tracing of the sources of funds of either
spouse. The combined augmented estates would contain: (1) the decedent's
augmented estate, now defined as his net probate estate plus the value of any
recapturables; plus (2) the surviving spouse's augmented estate, defined to
include that spouse's net worth, togetherwith the value of any recapturables
stemming from that spouse.
Including the survivor's augmented estate in the entity to which the forced
share attaches requires the second adjustment to the UPC's augmented-estate
system: In satisfying the forced share, the surviving spouse must be charged
with receipt of the survivor's own augmented estate. That is, the survivor's own
augmented estate (and property passing to the survivor as a result of the de-
43
UPC § 2-207.
44Because a forced-share system protects the property interest of the surviving spouse, it does
not recognize the contribution-based interest of the decedent spouse. The community-property
system does protect the decedent's interest as well, and in this respect our proposals will fall short
of the aspiration to achieve community-like outcomes. Community-like mutuality would require
granting to the estate of the deceased spouse a claim against the assets of the surviving spouse.
Such a right of election would have to devolve upon the decedent's personal representative, where
it would resemble somewhat the situation in current law in which a fiduciary makes the election
on behalf of a surviving spouse who is incompetent. See supra note 1 7, where it is explained that
in most jurisdictions the standard for making such an election is the survivor's need for support.
If a decedent spouse's election were created, that spouse would not require support, but that
spouses's personal representative would owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of that spouse's
estate. The election would become virtually automatic when not waived by a well drafted instru-
ment, in contrast to the present situation in which the forced share is actually exercised only rarely,
in cases of deliberate disinheritance of the survivor.
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cedent's death) would be subtracted from the survivor's potential forced-share
entitlement. Thus, whereas the UPC scheme currently charges the survivor
only with property stemming from the decedent, our notion is to charge the
survivor with the whole of the survivor's property. (We present a series of
illustrations in Appendix A of this article that demonstrate how the system
would operate in a variety of settings.) Estate planners familiar with modern
drafting techniques responsive to the federal transfer tax will recognize that
our proposal would allow the elective share in a long-duration marriage to
work in the nature of an equalization clause, hence to duplicate the fifty/fifty
split of the community and UMPA regimes.
It will be manifest that this proposal tends in the direction of the universal
community and away from the community of acquests that we prefer in prin-
ciple. Our proposal does not exclude the property that a spouse acquires by
inheritance or gift (so-called separate property), although in a late marriage of
short duration the incremental vesting feature does tend by approximation to
eliminate the value of property that was acquired before the marriage. Our
rationale is straightforward: We opt for the more inclusive system in order to
preserve a mechanical forced share-in order, that is, to avoid the tracing for
exclusion of separate property that the community of acquests would require.
But we think that several factors help to narrow the gap between those two
models in the forced-share context. In modern circumstances, it is unusual for
either spouse to bring significant separate property to a long-duration first
marriage. Further, when substantial separate property does enter such a mar-
riage, it need not necessarily unbalance the spouses' holdings; an affluent
person is more likely to marry someone of the same ilk than a pauper. For
short-duration marriages, the accrual mechanism that we have emphasized
would abate the consequences of an enriched forced share by diminishing the
vested portion of the short-term spouse's forced-share entitlement. Finally, in
the case in which there is material disparity in the wealth of the parties, the
premarital contract would be available to oust the default regime of the forced-
share law, as in current practice.
B. The Needy Survivor: Guarantee a Minimum Amount
Although we have shown why it is correct to see the contribution theory,
rather than the support theory, as the driving force behind the forced-share
system, we have also pointed out that the concepts largely overlap. Further-
more, the support theory unmistakably underlies such ancillary measures as
the family and homestead allowances.4 5 Accordingly, we think it consistent
with a system that is in the main based upon the contribution theory to make
particular provision for extreme need.
We recommend, therefore, a minimum share for the impoverished sur-
vivor. Fifty thousand dollars is the figure we have in mind. Under our proposal
45E.g., UPC Art. 2, Part 4.
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the survivor is charged with receipt of his own net assets plus the amounts
shifting to the survivor at the decedent's death. If those sums are less than the
$50,000 minimum, then the survivor should be entitled-at the least-to what-
ever additional portion of the decedent's estate is necessary, up to 100 percent,
to bring the survivor's assets up to that $50,000 level. In the case of a late
marriage, in which the survivor is aged in the mid-70s, the $50,000 figure
would be more or less enough to provide the survivor with a straight-life annuity
at a minimum subsistence level of approximately $10,000 per year.46
VII. CONCLUSION
The merits of the accrual system that we have proposed should be fairly
obvious in view of our critique of existing forced-share law. The serial-polygamy
windfalls would be eliminated (and this by itself is a further ground for in-
creasing the amount of the forced share from a third to a half). But because
the accrual-type mechanism would work automatically, the reform would not
require that vast dose of judicial discretion that makes TFM so frightening, nor
would it entail the tracing and other administrative complexity associated with
the community property and UMPA regimes.
To be sure, any system that has the advantage of mechanical application
will have the corresponding drawback: Mechanistic justice is rough justice,
and in most areas of the law we aspire to more than rough justice. But in the
realm of forced-share law, there are important reasons for thinking that we
cannot do better. Forced-share law is intrinsically arbitrary. The fixed fraction
(whether a third or a half or anything else) is arbitrary. So, too, is the very
premise on which the forced-share entitlement rests, that. is, the irrebuttable
presumption that the survivor contributed to the decedent's wealth. The law
could, in theory, open such questions to examination on the merits in each
case, but it has not, and for good reason. The proofs would be extraordinarily
46
See Table A, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f). The guaranteed minimum would also affect the
short-duration marriage that ends in death early in life. In the case of a late-in-life short-duration
marriage, not much wealth is acquired during the marriage, and the accrual-type forced share
produces a better result by not shifting substantial wealth in such circumstances. In an early
marriage, however, the partners typically enter the marriage with little in the way of separate
property, and all or most of the wealth will have been acquired during the marriage. Under a
community-property or UMPA regime, such property would have been community or marital
property, and thus divided evenly between the spouses. If the marriage terminates on early death
of one of the spouses, the survivor would be entitled to the community or marital half interest in
the property despite the short duration of the marriage. By contrast, under the accrual-type forced
share that we propose, the short duration of the marriage would cause the vested proportion of
the forced share to fall short of the full 50 percent, and thus the surviving spouse would be credited
with an inadequate return of contribution. This is not a problem of frequent occurrence; an early
marriage gone sour is much more likely to end in divorce than in disinheritance upon premature
death of one of the spouses. But a minimum entitlement of $50,000 would ameliorate, in a
concededly rough way, the rare case in which such an event came to pass.
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difficult. The issues in such a case would not resemble the issues in ordinary
fact-finding-issues such as whether the traffic light was green or red. Exam-
ining the true merits of the case under a forced-share system that tried to
establish the spouses' actual contributions to the family wealth would neces-
sarily entail an inquiry into virtually every facet of the spouses' conduct through-
out the marriage. Further, that litigation would arise just when death has sealed
the lips of the most affected party. These are the concerns that have in the past
led American policymakers to prefer a mechanical forced-share system over
the discretionary TFM system. Accordingly, we would claim that the accrual-
type system that we have recommended as a corrective for serial-polygamy
forced shares has the considerable virtue of consistency with the rest of a
mechanistic system. The reforms we propose would not achieve perfect justice.
They would, however, achieve much better justice for an area of private law
in which the results, at present, are too often repugnant.
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APPENDIX A
The six examples below present a variety of situations in which to assess
the redesigned elective share. The examples demonstrate how closely the
redesign tracks the result that would be reached under a community property
or UMPA regime. For comparison, we give the result under the current UPC's
forced share.
I. "WEALTHIER" SPOUSE DIES FIRST
Example 1-Long-Term Marriage
Married in their twenties, John and Mary lived a long life together. John
died at age 75 (his life expectancy), survived by Mary. Posit the value of John's
augmented estate to be $500,000 and Mary's to be $100,000.
Solution under Redesigned Elective Share
Because this was a 50-year marriage, Mary's elective share reached full
vesting, at the maximum 50 percent level, long before John's death. Combined,
their augmented estates have a value of $600,000. The redesigned system
grants Mary an elective share of $300,000 (50 percent of $600,000). Mary is
charged with receipt of her own $100,000 augmented estate, however, so her
entitlement from John's augmented estate is $200,000. Each spouse ends up
in control of $300,000.
Community Property/UMPA Result Compared
The result in Example 1 resembles the result that would be reached in a
community-property or UMPA state. Ordinarily, the whole of the spouses's
property would be community property or marital property; if so, each spouse
would own half of $600,000 or $300,000 each. (The example posits none of
the $600,000 to be the separate property of either spouse, by gift, inheritance,
or premarital earnings.)
Current UPC Elective Share Compared
If none of Mary's $100,000 was derived from John, Mary's elective share
would be $166,667 (1/3 of John's $500,000 augmented estate). The decedent,
John, controls $333,333 ($33,333 more than the appropriate figure under the
contribution theory) and the survivor, Mary, controls $266,667 ($33,333 less
than appropriate under the contribution theory).
Example 2-Short-Term Late Marriage
After John's death in Example 1, Mary married Charles. Four years later,
Mary died, survived by Charles. The value of Mary's augmented estate is
$300,000. The value of Charles' augmented estate is $100,000.
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Solution under Redesigned Elective Share
If 10 percent of the forced share vests upon marriage, and if the remainder
vests at an annual rate of 5 percent thereafter, 30 percent (10% + [4 x 5%])
of Charles' 50 percent elective share had vested when Mary died; thus Charles'
elective share is 15 percent (30% of 50%). Charles' elective share is $60,000
(15 percent of the combined augmented estates of $400,000). Inasmuch as
Charles is charged with receipt of his own $100,000 augmented estate, the
redesigned elective share does not entitle Charles to any forced-share amount
from Mary's estate. The decedent, Mary, maintains control of her $300,000
and the survivor, Charles, controls his $100,000.
Community Property/UMPA Result Compared
The result in Example 2 approximates the community-property or UMPA
result. Because this marriage was a second marriage late in life, in which both
spouses were probably retired, they would be unlikely to have much com-
munity property or marital property. Their earnings would have been low, and
most or all would have been consumed. The result would be that the decedent,
Mary, would control her separate property of $300,000 and the survivor, Charles,
would control his separate property of $100,000.
Current UPC Elective Share Compared
Assuming that none of Charles' $100,000 was derived from Mary, Charles'
elective share would be $100,000 (1/3 of Mary's $300,000 augmented estate).
The decedent, Mary, thus controls $200,000, which is $100,000 less than the
contribution theory would deem appropriate; and the survivor, Charles, con-
trols $200,000, $100,000 more than the contribution theory would dictate.
Example 3-Needy Surviving Spouse
In Example 2, suppose Mary's augmented estate to be $90,000 and Charles'
to be $10,000.
Solution under Redesigned Elective Share
Charles' forced share, under the redesigned system, would be $15,000
(15 percent of $100,000). Under the guaranteed $50,000 minimum recom-
mended in text, Charles' forced share would be raised to $50,000. Charles
would first be charged with his own $10,000 augmented estate, however, so
that he would receive $40,000 from Mary's estate.
II. "POORER" SPOUSE DIES FIRST
Example 4-Long-Term Marriage
Married in their twenties, John and Mary lived a long life together. John
died at age 75 (his life expectancy), survived by Mary. The value of John's
augmented estate is $100,000. The value of Mary's augmented estate is
$500,000.
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Solution under Redesigned Elective Share
Mary's elective share, having fully vested years before John's death, is
$300,000 (50 percent of the combined augmented estates of $600,000). How-
ever, because Mary is charged with receipt of her own augmented estate of
$500,000, she is entitled to no amount from John's estate.
Community Property/lUMPA Result Compared
Assuming the full $600,000 to be community property or marital property,
John's estate controls $300,000 and the survivor, Mary, controls $300,000.
The result in Example 4, although departing materially from the fifty/fifty com-
munity split, comes closer to the community property/UMPA result than any
other forced-share system.
Current UPC Elective Share Compared
Mary is entitled to a forced share of $33,333 (1/3 of John's $100,000
augmented estate). Mary controls $533,333, which is $233,333 more than the
contribution theory would dictate; John, the decedent, controls $66,667,
$233,333 less than the appropriate figure under the contribution theory.
Example 5-Short-Term Late Marriage
After John's death in Example 4, Mary married Charles. Four years later,
Charles died, survived by Mary. Charles' augmented estate is $100,000, Mary's
is $500,000.
Solution under Redesigned Elective Share
Mary takes nothing by way of elective share from Charles' estate. Mary's
elective share is $15,000 (15 percent of Charles' $100,000 augmented estate),
but she is charged with already having received her own $500,000 augmented
estate. Charles maintains control of his $100,000 estate.
Community Property/UMPA Result Compared
The result in Example 5 resembles the result that would be reached in a
community-property or UMPA state. Because this was a second marriage late
in life, in which both Mary and Charles were probably retired, there would
be little or no community or marital property, and Charles would keep control
of his $100,000 separate estate.
Current UPC Elective Share Compared
Mary's elective share would be $33,333 (1/3 of Charles' $100,000 aug-
mented estate). The survivor, Mary, ends up in control of $533,333, which is
$33,333 more than dictated by the contribution theory; the decedent, Charles,
controls $66,667, $33,333 less than appropriate under the contribution theory.
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Example 6-Needy Surviving Spouse
In Example 5, suppose that the values were different. Posit the value of
Mary's augmented estate to be $40,000 and Charles' to be $10,000.
Solution under Redesigned Elective Share
Because the marriage was a four-year marriage, the starting point is to
identify Mary's forced share as being $7,500 (15 percent of the combined
augmented estates of $50,000). Because Mary is charged with receipt of her
own $40,000 augmented estate, Mary would ordinarily get nothing from Charles'
estate. However, the guaranteed $50,000-minimum feature would change this
result by entitling her to all of Charles' $10,000, the amount necessary to raise
her net to $50,000.
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APPENDIX B
Uniform Probate Code, Official 1982 Text
Section 2-201 [Right to Elective Share.]
(a) If a married person domiciled in this state dies, the surviving spouse
has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the augmented
estate under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated.
(b) If a married person not domiciled in this state dies, the right, if any,
of the surviving spouse to take an elective share in property in this state is
governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at death.
Section 2-202 [Augmented Estate.]
The augmented estate means the estate reduced by funeral and admin-
istrative expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and exemptions,
and enforceable claims, to which is added the sum of the following amounts:
(1) The value of property transferred to anyone other than a bona fide
purchaser by the decedent at any time during marriage, to or for the benefit
of any person other than the surviving spouse, to the extent that the decedent
did not receive adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth
for the transfer, if the transfer is of any of the following types:
(i) any transfer under which the decedent retained at the time of his death
the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from the property;
(ii) any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time of his
death a power, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, to
revoke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his own
benefit;
(iii) any transfer whereby property is held at the time of decedent's death by
decedent and another with right of survivorship;
(iv) any transfer made to a donee within two years of death of the decedent
to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of
the years exceed $3,000.
Any transfer is excluded if made with the written consent or joinder of the
surviving spouse. Property is valued as of the decedent's death except that
property given irrevocably to a donee during lifetime of the decedent is valued
as of the date the donee came into possession or enjoyment if that occurs first.
Nothing herein shall cause to be included in the augmented estate any life
insurance, accident insurance, joint annuity, or pension payable to a person
nthr than thp zirvivine snouse.
(2) The value of property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's
death, plus the value of property transferred by the spouse at any time during
marriage to any person other than the decedent which would have been in-
cludible in the spouse's augmented estate if the surviving spouse had prede-
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ceased the decedent to the extent the owned or transferred property is derived
from the decedent by any means other than testate or intestate succession
without a full consideration in money or money's worth. For purposes of this
paragraph:
(i) Property derived from the decedent includes, but is not limited to, any
beneficial interest of the surviving spouse in a trust created by the de-
cedent during his lifetime, any property appointed to the spouse by the
decedent's exercise of a general or special power of appointment also
exercisable in favor of others than the spouse, any proceeds of insurance
(including accidental death benefits) on the life of the decedent attrib-
utable to premiums paid by him, any lump sum immediately payable
and the commuted value of the proceeds of annuity contracts under
which the decedent was the primary annuitant attributable to premiums
paid by him, the commuted value of amounts payable after the dece-
dent's death under any public or private pension, disability compen-
sation, death benefit or retirement plan, exclusive of the Federal Social
Security system, by reason of service performed or disabilities incurred
by the decedent, any property held at the time of decedent's death by
decedent and the surviving spouse with right of survivorship, any prop-
erty held by decedent and transferred by contract to the surviving spouse
by reason of the decedent's death and the value of the share of the
surviving spouse resulting from rights in community property in this or
any other state formerly owned with the decedent. Premiums paid by
the decedent's employer, his partner, a partnership of which he was a
member, or his creditors, are deemed to have been paid by the decedent.
(ii) Property owned by the spouse at the decedent's death is valued as of
the date of death. Property transferred by the spouse is valued at the
time the transfer became irrevocable, or at the decedent's death, which-
ever occured first. Income earned by included property prior to the
decedent's death is not treated as property derived from the decedent.
(iii) Property owned by the surviving spouse as of the decedent's death, or
previously transferred by the surviving spouse, is presumed to have been
derived from the decedent except to the extent that the surviving spouse
establishes that it was derived from another source.
(3) For purposes of this section a bona fide purchaser is a purchaser for
value in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim. Any recorded
instrument on which a state documentary fee is noted pursuant to [insert ap-
propriate reference] is prima facie evidence that the transfer described therein
was made to a bona fide purchaser.
Section 2-207 [Charging Spouse with Gifts Received;
Liability of Others for Balance of Elective Share.]
(a) In the proceeding for an elective share, values included in the aug-
mented estate which pass or have passed to the surviving spouse, or which
328 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
would have passed to the spouse but were renounced, are applied first to satisfy
the elective share and to reduce any contributions due from other recipients
of transfers included in the augmented estate. For purposes of this subsection,
the electing spouse's beneficial interest in any life estate or in any trust shall
be computed as if worth one half of the total value of the property subject to
the life estate, or of the trust estate, unless higher or lower values for these
interests are established by proof.
(b) Remaining property of the augmented estate is so applied that liability
for the balance of the elective share of the surviving spouse is equitably ap-
portioned among the recipients of the augmented estate in proportion to the
value of their interests therein.
(c) Only original transferees from, or appointees of, the decedent and their
donees, to the extent the donees have the property or its proceeds, are subject
to the contribution to make up the elective share of the surviving spouse. A
person liable to contribution may choose to give up the property transferred
to him or to pay its value as of the time it is considered in computing the
augmented estate.
